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Over the past several years increased shareholder activism has triggered 
significant corporate governance changes aimed at enhancing shareholders’ 
power over director elections and corporate affairs.  These changes threaten 
both the director primacy theory and the team production theory of corporate 
governance by undermining directors’ broad discretion to make decisions on 
behalf of the corporation and all of its constituents.  But such changes have not 
resulted in a regime of shareholder primacy.  Rather they can be better 
understood as a regime of shareholder leverage.  Despite the increased power at 
their disposal, in most circumstances, the shareholders remain content to defer 
to directors.  When they are not content, directors retain the freedom to ignore 
and even circumvent shareholders’ will, blunting the force of increased 
shareholder power.  The theory of shareholder leverage therefore contends that 
while the current governance regime paves the way for shareholders to exercise 
greater influence over director decision-making, directors still appropriately 
remain the primary power source in the modern public corporation. 
A significant number of corporate governance changes have occurred in 
the past few years, particularly surrounding executive compensation and director 
elections.  Indeed, public company shareholders now have a say on pay—an 
advisory vote on the compensation packages of the top executives.1  
Additionally, director election processes have been radically altered.  By the 
beginning of 2014, 91 percent of S&P 500 companies had declassified their 
boards—up from 40 percent a decade ago2—and almost 90 percent of S&P 500 
companies had adopted some form of majority voting whereby directors must 
either receive a majority shareholder vote or resign upon failure to receive 
majority shareholder support.3  In 2006, only 16 percent of S&P 500 companies 
had implemented such standards.4  Moreover, while the D.C. Circuit 
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overturned the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) mandated proxy 
access rule which would have required that corporations enable certain 
shareholders to nominate candidates of their choice on the corporation’s proxy 
statement,5 beginning in 2012 shareholders have been allowed to submit 
shareholder proposals seeking to adopt procedures for proxy access.6  These 
changes collectively pave the way towards greater shareholder influence over 
corporate affairs. 
Such changes also appear to breathe new life into the shareholder primacy 
theory while undermining both the director primacy and team production 
theory of corporate governance.  Enhanced shareholder power certainly runs 
counter to the broad director discretion envisioned by director primacy.  It not 
only limits director decision-making in connection with management and their 
pay policies but also constrains directors’ freedom to make business decisions 
that may be disfavored by shareholders.  Increased shareholder power also 
increases the probability that directors will focus exclusively on shareholders 
rather than balancing the competing concerns of all corporate constituents as 
envisioned by the team production model. 
But evidence reveals that with respect to compensation and election 
matters, shareholders are largely content not to exercise their increased powers.  
Thus, the vast majority of directors continue to get elected at high rates.7  In the 
last election cycle, only 61 director nominees received less than majority 
support.8  Similarly, shareholders overwhelmingly approve the vast majority of 
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pay packages, with the result that less than 2 percent of company pay packages 
get rejected.9  Then too, when shareholders exercise their power, directors are 
able to thwart that exercise.  There are several highly publicized examples of 
shareholders repeatedly rejecting pay packages that corporations do not alter.10  
This is because some corporations have opted to ignore the advisory say on pay 
vote.  Evidence also reveals that most directors who fail to receive a majority of 
the shareholder vote remain on the board.  Of the 61 directors who failed to 
receive majority vote in 2013, 51 remained on the board at the start of the 2014 
proxy season, resulting in what some have called “zombie directors.”11  This is 
because the board has discretion to refuse to accept directors’ resignations or 
otherwise retain directors, when they fail to get a majority vote.12  This means 
that directors have considerable discretion to make decisions that are at odds 
with shareholder preferences. 
To be sure, despite this discretion shareholders do enjoy significantly more 
sway over director decision-making.  Empirical evidence confirms that directors 
have increased their engagement with shareholders, enhanced their disclosures 
in an effort to prevent any shareholder discontent, and altered their policies on 
compensation as well as director recruitment and retention.13  These actions 
suggest that while the board continues to have considerable discretion in the 
current corporate governance regime, shareholders have increased leverage.  The 
critical question then becomes whether a shareholder leverage model of 
corporate governance can provide a more appropriate balance between board 
discretion and accountability. 
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